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THE MISAPPLICATION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY:
UNFAIR PROCEDURAL BURDENS FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGE CLAIMS
REQUIRING PROOF OF THE
DEFENDANT'S INTENT
CLA Y J PIER CE
INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1988, Brett C. Kimberlin, a prisoner in an Oklahoma
federal correctional institution, announced to the news media that he had
previously sold marijuana to Dan Quayle, who then was the Republican
nominee for Vice President of the United States.' Following Kimberlin's
initial contacts with the press, prison officials placed him in administrative detention three separate times, both before and after the November
election.' In response, Kimberlin brought a damages suit against the re-

sponsible officials for violating his First Amendment rights. 3 He alleged

that the first two detentions were intended to prevent him from talking to
the press, and that the third was in retaliation for his having initially
publicized his story.4
Several pieces of circumstantial evidence supported Kimberlin's assertion that the defendants' actions were meant to prevent further contacts
between him and the media.5 Despite this evidentiary showing, however,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed his
case after the defendants moved for summary judgment.6 Because the
defendants were government officials and thus were protected by qualified immunity,7 the D.C. Circuit said that Kimberlin had to satisfy a
1. See Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
2. See id at 792-93.
3. See id at 790. While Kimberlin had initially alleged violations of other constitutional and federal statutory provisions, only the First Amendment charge was at issue
before the D.C. Circuit. See id
4. See id at 793.
5. Kimberlin offered evidence indicating the unusual involvement of high-ranking
personnel in his detentions, as well as contacts between those high-ranking officials and
members of the Bush-Quayle campaign committee. See id. at 801-02. Although the defendants asserted that Kimberlin's detentions were alternatively meant to protect his
safety or to punish him for making third-party phone calls from within the prison, Kimberlin was nontheless able to highlight contradictions between the stories of the individual defendants. See id
6. See id at 798.
7. Both federal and state courts generally provide immunity for discretionary, but
not ministerial, governmental duties. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 n.14
(1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982); Susan L. Abbott, Note, Liability
of the State and its Employees for the Negligent Investigation of Child Abuse Reports, 10
Alaska L. Rev. 401, 414 (1993). This immunity serves two distinct purposes: first, it
preserves the separation of powers by preventing courts from interfering with executive
and legislative decisions through the imposition of tort liability; second, it ensures that
private citizens cannot use the courts to intimidate government officials from making
necessary policy decisions. See Abbot, supra, at 414; Kelly M. Tullier, Note, Governmen-
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"heightened pleading" standard, under which a plaintiff can avoid dismissal only by offering direct evidence of the defendants' unlawful intent.8 Because Kimberlin was able to offer only circumstantial evidence
of the defendants' intent, the court dismissed his claim.9
The D.C. Circuit derived its heightened pleading standard from
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,10 in which the Supreme Court established an objective standard for granting qualified immunity to government officials."
Before Harlow, plaintiffs bringing constitutional damage claims could defeat a defendant's claim of immunity by alleging that the official knew his
actions were unconstitutional, thus disputing any contention by the defendant that he acted in good faith.' 2 Issues of fact regarding whether
the defendant knew his actions to be unconstitutional would often prevent dismissal of such cases at the summary judgment stage. 13 As a result, the plaintiff could subject the defendant to the burdens of discovery
and trial even if the plaintiff's claim of "malice" proved to be

unsubstantiated. 14
The Harlow court eliminated these subjective inquiries and instructed
lower courts considering qualified immunity claims to dismiss the plaintiff's case unless he alleges a violation of a clearly defined constitutional
right of which a reasonable person would have known.5 By limiting the
relevant analysis to an exclusively objective inquiry, the Court transformed qualified immunity into an issue of law that courts could determine at the summary judgment stage.1 6 In order to spare government
defendants the burden of unnecessary discovery, the Court stated that
discovery should not be allowed until after resolution of the qualified
immunity issue.' 7
tal Liabilityfor Negligent Failure to Detain Drunk Drivers, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 873, 881
(1992).
8. See Tullier, supra note 7, at 793-94.
9. See id. at 798.
10. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
11. See id. at 817-18.
12. See id. at 815-16.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 818. A host of articles have been published that either challenge or
support Harlow's formulation of the qualified immunity standard. Compare David
Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: JudicialActivism
and the Restriction of ConstitutionalRights, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 23, 77 (1989) (asserting
that Harlow's approach to qualified immunity subordinates constitutional protections to
interests of government efficiency) with Charles T. Putnam & Charles T. Ferris, Defending a Maligned Defense: The Policy Bases of the Qualified Immunity Defense in Actions
Under 42 U.SC. § 1983, 12 Bridgeport L. Rev. 665, 668 (1992) (stating that Harlow's
approach to qualified immunity is necessary to promote federalism, reduce the federal
civil rights case load, prevent "overdeterrance," and avoid an overly expansive reading of
[§ 1983] that could trivialize the Constitution). Despite the ongoing debate regarding
the appropriateness of Harlow's holding, this Note confines itself to issues arising from
the misapplication of Harlow to intent-based constitutional claims.
16. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
17. See id.
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Unfortunately, Harlow's prohibition against subjective inquiries has
proven to be problematic when lower courts, such as the D.C. Circuit in

Kimberlin, are confronted with constitutional claims requiring proof of
the defendant's unlawful intent."8 While the Harlow Court intended only

to foreclose inquiries into the defendant's knowledge of the law, 9 some
lower courts have misinterpreted Harlow's restriction on "bare allega-

tions of malice"'2 to limit inquiries into the motivations underlying the

defendant's actions where such motivations are an element of the plain-

tiff's substantive claim.2 ' Based on this misperceived conflict between

Harlow and claims requiring proof of the defendant's intent, courts have

forced plaintiffs bringing this type of claim to offer a higher level of proof
of the defendant's intent than is normally required once a defendant

moves for dismissal or for summary judgment. 2 Often, courts will demand that the plaintiff satisfy these increased procedural burdens before

allowing the plaintiff to conduct discovery into the defendant's motives.'
Both courts and critics have attacked this application of Harlow, arguing that Harlow should not restrict a plaintiff's ability to prove the de-

fendant's unlawful intent as part of his substantive constitutional claim."4

Courts have reasoned that because the issue of the defendant's unlawful
motive is an issue of fact distinct from issues relating to qualified immunity, the plaintiff should be held to normal procedural standards when
establishing the defendant's motives.25 The Supreme Court recently fortifled this argument in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 6 in which it flatly rejected a pleading
standard imposed by the Fifth Circuit which exceeded the general standard of notice pleading set up under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.27 In light of Leatherman, it seems clear that courts are not entitled
to impose increased procedural burdens on plaintiffs bringing intent18. As used in this Note, the term "intent" stands for the motives or purposes underlying an individual's actions. For a discussion of the constitutional claims which require
proof of the defendant's intent, see infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying notes.
20. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982).
21. In Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1993), for example, the plaintiff's
claim necessarily involved a subjective inquiry into what motivated the defendant's actions. In order to establish liability, the plaintiff was required to prove that the defendants' actions were motivated by retaliatory concerns. See Mount Healthy City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (requiring the plaintiff to prove the
defendant's retaliatory motives as part of his claim that he was fired for exercising his
First Amendment rights). Despite the fact that this subjective inquiry related to the
plaintiff's substantive claim, and not to any attempt by him to defeat the defendants'
qualified immunity defense, the D.C. Circuit still interpreted Harlow to require the plaintiff to meet increased procedural burdens to avoid dismissal. See Kimberlin, 6 F.3d at
793-94.
22. See infra notes 130-44 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 147, 154-55 and accompanying text.
26. 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
27. See id. at 1163.
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based claims.28
This Note argues that courts should not raise procedural burdens for
plaintiffs bringing constitutional damage claims based on the defendant's
unlawful intent. Part I discusses constitutional damage claims requiring
proof of intent,29 as well as the Supreme Court's attempt in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald3 to design a qualified immunity standard that would balance
the plaintiff's interest in vindicating his constitutional rights with the defendant's need for immunity from meritless suits. 3 Part II begins with
an examination of how the lower courts have understood Harlow to relate to inquiries into the defendant's allegedly unlawful intent, looking at
arguments advanced for both expansive and narrow readings of Harlow's
scope.3 2 Part II then discusses the different procedural standards courts
have imposed on claims requiring proof of intent based on their understanding of Harlow's holding and purpose.3 3 Part III discusses what implications Leatherman poses for lower courts departing from the
procedural standards provided for in the Federal Rules.3 4 Part IV argues
that, in light of both Harlow and Leatherman, courts are not justified in
increasing procedural burdens beyond the levels normally required under
the Federal Rules.3 5 Part IV then describes how courts can effectively
deal with potentially frivolous intent-based claims by applying conventional procedural mechanisms.3 6 Finally, this Note concludes that despite the perceived need to offer an increased level of protection to
government defendants, the standards provided for in the Federal Rules
constitute the best instruments for shielding defendants while still allowing plaintiffs to bring claims requiring proof of intent.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has provided a federal damages
remedy for individuals suffering violations of their constitutional rights
by government officials.3 7 While access to federal court has increased for
such plaintiffs over the past three decades,3" the Supreme Court has tempered this increased access by imposing specific limitations on plaintiffs
bringing constitutional damage claims. First, in some instances, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant's actions were motivated by an
unconstitutional intent before a constitutional violation is established.39
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
457 U.S. 800 (1982).
See infra notes 53-80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 93-125 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 126-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 161-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
See infra note 42.
See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
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Second, in order to ensure that government officials are not unduly burdened with defending potentially frivolous claims, the Supreme Court
has held that government officials are immune from suit when their al-

leged actions are objectively reasonable in light of clearly established
law.4°
A.

ConstitutionalDamage Claims Requiring Proofof the
Defendant's Intent

Under the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics,4 1 an individual may recover dam-

ages infederal court against federal officials who violate that individual's

constitutional rights.4 2 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides an individual

with this same federal damages remedy for constitutional violations by
state officials.4 3 For immunity purposes, the Supreme Court has held
that defendants being sued for constitutional violations under Bivens or
40. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
41. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
42. See iL at 395. In Bivens, the plaintiff sued federal narcotics agents who had conducted a warrantless search of his apartment and who had arrested the plaintiff on narcotics charges, all allegedly without probable cause. See id. at 389. Rejecting the
defendant's arguments that plaintiff was limited to a state law remedy, the Supreme
Court held that a federal cause of action for damages exists for plaintiffs whose Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated by federal officials. See id. at 395. In finding federal jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim, the Court noted that since the Fourth Amendment was meant to counteract the enhanced "capacity for harm" possessed by agents
acting under federal authority, it was reasonable for a federal court to provide a remedy
where the plaintiff's constitutional rights had been violated. See id. at 392. The Supreme
Court has extended the Bivens analysis to claims based on violations of the First, Fifth,
and Eighth Amendments. See generally Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1980)
(Eighth Amendment); David v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979) (Fifth Amendment); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 194-96 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
916 (1978) (First Amendment).
43. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Originally enacted in 1871 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's anti-discrimination provisions, the statute was used infrequently during its first
ninety years. See Daan Braveman, Protecting Constitutional Freedoms: A Role for Federal Courts 46 (1989); see also Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies
for Official Wrongs 47-48 (1983) (noting that the statute's major turning point occured
ninety years after its enactment). In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), however, the
Supreme Court substantially expanded the statute's availability when it held that plaintiffs suffering constitutional harms at the hands of state officials could make use of § 1983
even when the defendants' conduct was committed in violation of state law. See id. at
172-87. Since Monroe, the number of civil rights actions being filed against state officials
in the federal judiciary has vastly increased. See Schuck, supra, at 48-51 (discussing
marked increase in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since Monroe and subsequent
Supreme Court decisions).
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Accordingly,

lower federal courts have widely enforced this principle of equal treatment for federal and state defendants.4"

Certain constitutional claims brought under either Bivens or § 1983

require proof of the defendant's unlawful intent.4 6 This is most notably

the case in Equal Protection claims. Under the Supreme Court's decision

in Washington v. Davis,47 a plaintiff must prove a defendant's discriminatory intent in order to obtain a remedy under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 8 Thus, a plaintiff claiming to be
the victim of a discriminatory act must prove not merely that the act of
the defendant adversely affected him, but also that such potentially adverse effects motivated the defendant's actions.4 9
The plaintiff bears a similar burden when his claim alleges that certain
acts were done in order to prevent or punish the exercise of constitutional
rights.5" For example, if a plaintiff claims that he was fired for speech
protected by the First Amendment, he must demonstrate that there were

retaliatory motives underlying his termination.51 Likewise, if the plaintiff
claims that the defendant took some action to inhibit the plaintiff from
exercising his First Amendment rights, he must show that the defendant's actions were
deliberately directed at suppressing the plaintiff's pro52
tected speech.
44. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500-01 (1978) (holding that it would be
nonsensical to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity between federal officials sued
under Bivens and state officials being sued under § 1983).
45. See, e.g., F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the immunitites recognized under Bivens are the same as for § 1983 cases); Chin
v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that same immunity standards apply in
§ 1983 and Bivens cases); Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1055 n.20 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (discussing how Bivens and § 1983 are coextensive with regard to both liability and
immunity).
46. See Laird Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort under Section 1983: The
State of Mind Requirement, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 45, 50-53 (1977) (discussing when the
plaintiff must prove the defendant's intent when claiming that the defendant violated the
plaintiff's constitutional rights); see also Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of
Mind: DeterminingResponsibility in Section 1983 MunicipalLiability Litigation, 60 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 417, 423-32 (1992) (discussing how the Court has used intent standards to
distinguish constitutional violations from common law torts).
47. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
48. See id. at 239-42.
49. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (requiring plaintiffs to
prove that the defendants "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group").
50. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 53.
51. See Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977).
52. See Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctr. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 647 (10th Cir.
1988) (stating that proof of intent is the critical element in establishing that state officials'
contested search was designed to interfere with the plaintiffs' First Amendment speech
and associational rights).
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Qualified Immunity: Finding the Appropriate Level of Protection
for Government Officials

By creating an exclusively objective standard of qualified immunity in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald," the Supreme Court attempted to provide an in-

creased level of protection for government officials facing constitutional
damage claims.

In its initial qualified immunity decisions, the Court

granted immunity to government officials either because the official acted

in "good faith,"' or because the official's actions appeared "reasonable"
under the prevailing circumstances. "5 When lower courts became confused as to whether qualified immunity involved a subjective or objective
inquiry, 56 the Court explained in Wood v. Strickland 7 that the qualified
immunity analysis necessarily contains both objective and subjective ele-

ments. The analysis is subjective in that the defendant official, to receive
protection, must have acted "with a belief that he [was] doing right."

8

The analysis is objective, however, in that officials could not receive pro53. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
54. The good faith approach to qualified immunity originated in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967). In Pierson, the plaintiffs sued three policemen for arresting them under
an allegedly unconstitutional Mississippi statute that barred the interracial use of segregated public facilities. See id. at 548-50. The Fifth Circuit rejected the police officers'
claim of good faith immunity and held that common law immunities did not exist for law
enforcement officials sued under § 1983. See Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213, 218 (5th Cir.
1965), rev'd, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision, holding it fundamentally unfair to impose liability where a police officer acts under a
statute that he believed to be valid but which is later held unconstitutional. See id. at 555.
55. The Court first articulated an objective analysis for qualified immunity in Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). In Scheuer, the Court considered how the good faith
defense previously applied to law enforcement officers should apply in the case of high
ranking executive officials. The defendants in Scheuer were Ohio officials responsible for
sending the National Guard to quell the infamous student uprising at Kent State University. See id. at 234. Noting that the range of policy decisions faced by such officials is
both varied and complex, see id. at 246, the Court held that the range of discretion afforded them should be broad enough to ensure prompt and effective action when crises
arise. See iL at 247. Declining to articulate any bright line test, the Court instead stated
that the scope of the immunity should be determined according to the discretion and
responsibilities of the officeholder in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances as
they reasonably appeared at the time of the action. See id. at 248 (citing Moyer v.
Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909)).
56. Confusion over whether qualified immunity involved a subjective or objective
analysis was reflected in decisions throughout lower courts. See Leon Friedman, The
Good Faith Defense in ConstitutionalLitigation, 5 Hofstra L. Rev. 501, 510-12 (1977);
David P. Stoelting, Comment, QualifiedImmunity for Law Enforcement Officials in Section 1983 Excessive Force Cases, 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. 243, 245 (1989).
57. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). In Wood, the Court resolved a dispute between the trial and
appellate courts regarding whether the qualified immunity analysis was subjective or objective. See id. at 321. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that liability could
be imposed only if the defendants had acted with "malice" or "ill will" towards the plaintiffs. See id at 313-14. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, rejecting the district
court's analysis, held that specific intent was not a prerequisite to liability, and that the
standard was essentially objective. See Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 191 (8th Cir.
1973), vacated sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
58. Wood, 420 U.S. at 321.
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tection where they ignorantly believed their actions to be appropriate
when in fact their actions violated "settled" and "indisputable" law.59
Based on these subjective and objective elements, the Court held that a
government official is not immune from liability if he knew, or reasonably should have known, that the action he took would violate the rights
of the individual affected, or if he acted with the malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of a constitutional right."°
Eventually, it became clear that litigating issues regarding defendants'
knowledge of the law imposed too great a burden on government officials.6" Because lower courts construed issues regarding defendants'
knowledge of the law as questions of fact, it was extremely difficult for
defendants to have frivolous cases dismissed at the summary judgment
stage.62 As a result, officials were exposed to trial as well as to broad
ranging discovery, both of which the Harlow
Court regarded as "pecu63
liarly disruptive to effective government.,
In order to remove these burdens from government defendants, the
Harlow Court eliminated the subjective prong of the qualified immunity
analysis previously identified in Wood v. Strickland.6 4 After Harlow,
judges considering a claim of qualified immunity need only determine
whether the defendant's alleged conduct violated a clearly defined constitutional right of which a reasonable official would have known. 65 By
limiting qualified immunity analysis to a consideration of exclusively objective factors, the Court transformed qualified immunity into an issue of
66
law that could easily be resolved on a motion for summary judgment.
Thus, if the law was not clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation, an official could not reasonably be expected to have known that
it forbade the conduct in question, and the case may therefore be dismissed. 67 To reduce the burdens imposed on defendant officials during
pre-trial proceedings, the Court held that discovery should not be proceed until the qualified immunity issue is resolved.6 8
By shifting the inquiry from whether the official acted in good faith to
whether the official's alleged actions were objectively reasonable, the
Court ensured that bare allegations of "malice" would no longer be sufficient to subject government officials to the burdens of discovery and
59. See id. Thus, qualified immunity's objective element holds the defendant official

to a reasonable knowledge of the law involved in the exercise of his duties. See id. at 322
("[A] school board member.., must be held to a standard of conduct based not only on
permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional
rights of his charges.").
60. See id.at 322.
61. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-17 (1982).

62. See id.
at 815-16.
63. Id. at 817.
64. See id.
at 817-18.
65. See id.at 818.

66. See id.at 818-19.
67. See id.at 818.
68. See id.
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trial.6 9 This increased level of protection for defendants did not, however, eliminate the plaintiffs' right to a remedy. 70 Indeed, the Court emphasized that by defining qualified immunity in essentially objective
terms, it was striking a balance between the plaintiff's right to a damages
remedy for violations of his constitutional rights and the defendant's ability to perform necessary government functions free from the specter of
potential litigation.71
Decisions following Harlow primarily addressed the issue of when a
government official acted reasonably in light of established law.72 In Anderson v. Creighton,7 3 the Court set down specific criteria to be used in
determining whether a right is "clearly established. 7 4 In Anderson, the
plaintiffs claimed their Fourth Amendment rights had been violated
when the defendant officials conducted a warrantless search of their
home under the mistaken belief that the plaintiffs were harboring a bank
robbery suspect.7 5 The Eighth Circuit denied the defendant's immunity
defense and held that the plaintiff's claim satisfied Harlow's objective test
because a home owner's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures was clearly established at the time of the violation. 6
The Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's analysis as an overly
broad articulation of the right in question.77 The Court stated that the
right allegedly violated must be defined in a particularized way.78 Specifically, the "contours" of the right allegedly violated must be sufficiently
clear so that a reasonable official would understand that his conduct violates that right.7 9 Otherwise, plaintiffs could circumvent Harlow's guarantee of immunity by alleging the violation of a constitutional right so
abstract that no one could reasonably dispute its being clearly
established."0
69. See id at 817-18.
70. See id.at 819.
71. See id.("Where an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would
violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who
suffers injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action. But where an official's
duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated,
the public interest may be better served by action taken 'with independence and without
fear of consequences.'" (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
72. See e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986) (rejecting defendant police
officer's argument that submission of baseless warrant application was reasonable per se
where the officer believes the alleged facts to be true); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183,
192-93 (1984) (holding state employer's discharge of plaintiff to be reasonable under the
Due Process Clause where the plaintiff is informed as to the reason for his discharge and
where state law provided a for full evidentiary hearing after termination).
73. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
74. See id. at 640.
75. See id.at 637.
76. See id.at 638.
77. See id.at 639-40.
78. See id. at 640.
79. See ia&
80. See id.at 639.
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THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
TO CLAIMS REQUIRING PROOF OF THE DEFENDANT'S
INTENT

Despite the fact that Harlow foreclosed only those subjective inquiries
that relate to the qualified immunity analysis,8 1 some lower courts have
read Harlow to restrict all types of subjective inquiries, even when they
are necessary to establish the plaintiff's substantive claim.82 While some
courts restrict such inquiries based on a misinterpretation of Harlow's
holding, 3 others do so based on Harlow's stated policy goals.8 4 Under
either rationale, courts have used Harlow to justify imposing procedural
burdens which exceed those provided for in the Federal Rules.8"
A.

The ProperScope of Qualified Immunity

Based upon Harlow and the Supreme Court's most recent decisions
regarding qualified immunity, courts facing Bivens or § 1983 claims
must determine only whether the defendant's alleged conduct violates a
clearly defined right under the Constitution. 6 Because the analysis is
wholly objective, a plaintiff cannot defeat immunity merely by alleging
that the defendant knew his conduct was unconstitutional. 87 Rather, the
plaintiff must prove that the right was sufficiently clear for a reasonable
government official to know that his conduct would violate that right. 88
If the plaintiff's substantive claim requires proof of the defendant's intent, the scope of the qualified immunity analysis should not change. A
court need only consider whether the claim as alleged is based on a
clearly defined right. If, for example, a plaintiff claims that he was fired
by a government employer because he is an African-American, it is clear
that the defendant cannot claim qualified immunity, since the right to be
free from racial discrimination is clearly established under the Fourteenth Amendment.89 Indeed, one could not reasonably dispute that the
"contours" of the right not to be fired because of one's race are clearly
81. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text
82. See infra notes 93-106, 119-25 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 130-44, 148-51 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (stating that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law");
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985) (proclaiming officials to be immune unless
the law clearly proscribes their actions); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
(providing original articulation of the objective standard).
87. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18 (holding that "bare allegations of malice" not
enough to force defendants into discovery or trial); see also supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
88. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
89. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (holding
that governmental employment decisions based on racial factors violate the Fourteenth
Amendment except where such decisions are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest).

1994]

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

1779

defined under the Constitution.' Harlow's bar on discovery pending resolution of the qualified immunity analysis makes sense in this context,
because no discovery is required for a court to determine whether the
rights allegedly violated were clearly defined under the Constitution. 9 1
B.

The Confusion over Harlow's Relationship to Claims Requiring
Proofof the Defendant's Intent

Despite the narrow and relatively straightforward inquiry required to
evaluate a qualified immunity defense, courts have differed widely in
their interpretations of how Harlow's language applies to claims that require inquiry into the defendant's motives. Because Harlow flatly prohibits bare allegations of "malice," courts have questioned whether Harlow's
holding bans not only inquiries into the defendant's knowledge of the
law, but also inquiries into what motivated the defendant's actions.9 2
In Halperin v. Kissinger,93 Justice Scalia94 offered an elaborate defense
of interpreting Harlow to bar inquiries into the defendant's motives, even
where the plaintiff is required to prove the defendant's motives as part of
his claim. In Halperin, a former staff member of the National Security
Council brought a claim for damages against ten federal officials, alleging
that their warrantless wiretapping of the plaintiff's home telephone violated his Fourth Amendment rights." In considering whether Harlow
barred inquiry into the actual motives behind the defendant's actions,
Justice Scalia observed that a "respectable" argument could be made for
such an interpretation.9 6 He reasoned that no other hypothesis achieves
the true "objectification" of the qualified immunity defense, which was
90. Cf Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (holding that the "contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right").
91. See Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Qualified Immunity for Government Offlcials: The
Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 Yale L.J. 126, 142
(1985) ("No factual discovery is needed for a court to determine whether the plaintiff's
allegationswith respect to the nature of the official's conduct make out a violation of
clearly established law.").
92. The Harlow court's prohibition against subjective inquiries did not expressly distinguish between those inquiries that relate to qualified immunity and those that relate to
the plaintiff's substantive claim, thus leaving lower federal court's in a quandry over how
to deal with motive-based claims. See id at 127; John D. Kirby, Note, Qualified Immunity for Civil Rights Standards: Refining the Standard, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 462, 482-83
n.155 (1990) (discussing the difficulty experienced by lower federal courts in applying
Harlow to motive-related claims); see also Note, Qualified Immunity: Interpreting
Harlow and its Progeny, 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1047, 1052 (1988) ("Harlow might have
only proscribed inquiry into the official's knowledge of the law, or alternatively, it might
have proscribed inquiry into both the official's knowledge of the law and the 'intent' of
the official if intent is an element of the claim.").
93. 807 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
94. Justice Scalia was a Circuit Judge when the case was briefed and argued, and was
a designated Circuit Justice on the date of the decision. See id. at 180.
95. See id at 182-83. The plaintiff also alleged that the wiretap violated Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968. See id.
96. See id at 186.
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Furthermore, according to Justice

Scalia, objections that such an interpretation would unfairly leave the
plaintiff without a civil remedy are undercut by the fact that even under
the narrowest interpretation of Harlow, defendants who knowingly violate the law are still immune if the reasonable official would consider the
conduct in question "arguably proper."98 Although the Halperin court
ultimately decided that an exclusively objective inquiry into whether the
defendant's actions could have had a reasonable basis was appropriate, it
expressly limited its holding to situations where the defendant claims his
actions were motivated by a national security interest. 99
Few courts have reached Halperin's result and interpreted Harlow to
bar inquiry into the defendant's actual motivations once the defendant

can offer a reasonable justification for his actions."I ° Nevertheless, some

courts still characterize Harlow's language as conflicting with claims
based on the defendant's motives.' 0 ' For example, in Elliott v.
Thomas,'0 2 the Seventh Circuit considered whether the plaintiff should
be allowed discovery into whether the defendants discharged her from
her university position in retaliation for her protected speech.,0 3 After
briefly considering whether the plaintiff's complaint alleged a violation of
clearly established law,"° the court looked to Harlow to determine under
97. See id.
98. See id. This argument is problematic in light of the Supreme Court's assertion in
Harlow that where a right has not been clearly defined, a defendant could not reasonably
be said to know that his actions violated that right. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982).
99. See Halperin, 807 F.2d at 188. After the court considered whether Harlow could
bar inquiry into defendant's motivations in general, the court discussed reasons why such
a result was especially warranted in situations where a national security interest is involved. See id. at 187-88.
100. See, e.g., Floyd v. Farrel, 765 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that "actual
motives for conduct" are not to be considered once defendant has made a qualified immunity defense). The court in Halperin noted that they had encountered no court that was
willing to extend "Harlow's proscription of subjective inquiry beyond the issue of...
intent related to knowledge of the law." Halperin, 807 F.2d at 186.
101. See, e.g., Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting the
existence of a "tension ...between Harlow's emphasis on 'objective reasonableness' and
cases in which the 'clearly established law' at issue contains a subjective element, such as
motive or intent"); Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing the
difficulty of allowing the plaintiffs request for discovery into the actual purposes behind
defendant's actions in light of Harlow's ban on subjective inquiries), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 973 (1992).
102. 937 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 973 (1992).
103. See id. at 341, 344.
104. The plaintiff's claim in Elliott rested on the Supreme Court's decision in Pickering
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968), which held that a constitutional violation
exists when a public employee is forced to relinquish First Amendment rights where such
rights outweigh state employer's interest in promoting efficiency of public services.
Although the Elliott court implicitly acknowledged that the plaintiff's claim could potentially give rise to liability under the Pickeringstandard, see 937 F.2d at 343, it ultimately
focused its qualified immunity analysis on the resolution of factual disputes between the
parties. See id. at 343-44.
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what circumstances the plaintiff's requested discovery was permissible."° 5
Since the plaintiff's discovery was aimed at establishing the intent element of her substantive claim, one may infer from such reasoning that
the court viewed Harlow as applying not only to inquiries into the defendants' knowledge of the law, but also to inquiries into the defendants'
motives.' 0 6
In contrast to Halperin and Elliott, many courts have expressly re-

jected arguments that Harlowforecloses inquiries into the motives behind
the defendant's actions when the defendant's intent is an element of the

underlying claim."07 Such courts have asserted that the issue of the de-

fendant's motives is an issue of fact that is analytically distinct from
questions regarding the defendant's knowledge of the law. 10 Under this
analysis, a defendant's challenge to the plaintiff's allegations regarding

the defendant's underlying motives simply creates a factual dispute."
Where a genuine factual dispute exists, the defendant cannot prevent inquiry into his underlying motives merely by offering up a permissible
excuse for his conduct. 110
Several considerations support the conclusion that Harlow does not
bar inquiries into the defendant's motives. To begin with, inquiries into
the defendant's motives were simply not at issue in the cases leading up
to Harlow. In initially establishing a "subjective" inquiry as part of the
qualified immunity analysis, the Court focused on the need to insulate
officials who reasonably believed their actions to be legal."'I In Wood v.
105. See id.at 344-45.
106. See Karen N. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User'sManual, 26 Ind. L. Rev. 187,
197 (1993) ("[Elliott] appears to embrace [a] common source of confusion: the failure to
distinguish between the substantive law controlling the question of liability when a claim
requires proof of impermissible motive and the law applicable to the qualified immunity
defense.").
107. See, e.g., Feliciano-Angulo v. Rivera-Cruz, 858 F.2d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1988)
("Harlow does not rule out the need to inquire into the actual reasons behind an official's
conduct when the official's state of mind is a necessary component of the constitutional
violation ....");Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 743 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that
inquiry into a defendant's motives is appropriate since "Harlow precludes inquiry into
the defendant's state of mind only with respect to the state of the law"); Kenyatta v.
Moore, 744 F.2d 1179, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984) (asserting that Harlow did not eliminate
subjective inquiry from qualified immunity where the constitutionality of an action turns
on whether the defendant's purposes were permissible), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066
(1985).
108. See e.g., Feliciano,858 F.2d at 45 (distinguishing the issue of the defendant official's experience in the law from the issue of whether the defendant fired the plaintiff for a
discriminatory reason); Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding that a defendant's assertion that his actions were founded on permissible
motives relates directly to the merits of the case, not to qualified immunity); see also
Sanchez v. Sanchez, 777 F. Supp. 906, 916 (D.N.M. 1991) (criticizing courts that conflate
the issue of defendant's liability under the substantive law with the issue of the defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity).
109. See Feliciano, 858 F.2d at 45.
110. See id.at 45-46.
111. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975) (stating that the proper immunity standard should allow public school officials to understand that actions taken in
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Strickland," 2 the Court expressly stated that the subjective element of
the analysis defeated immunity where the defendant knew his actions to
be unconstitutional.' 1 3 Because Wood so clearly indicates that the "subjective prong" of the qualified immunity analysis involves only inquiries
into the defendant's knowledge of the law, it makes little sense to interpret Harlow's elimination of the subjective prong to foreclose anything
other than those same inquiries.
Harlow's own procedural history provides further indication that the
Court did not intend the qualified immunity analysis to foreclose claims
requiring inquiry into the defendant's motives. In Harlow, the plaintiff
4
alleged that he was fired for exercising his First Amendment rights.' 1 If
the Harlow court had truly intended to bar inquiries into the purposes
underlying the defendants' actions and thereby achieve an exclusively objective analysis, it could easily have granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment based on the fact that plaintiff's claim required inquiry into what motivated the defendants' actions.'" 5 Instead, the Court
remanded the case for further factual findings. 6 Since the Harlow court
remanded the case for further discovery instead of granting the defendant's summary judgment motion, it seems difficult to argue that Harlow
bars claims requiring motive-related inquiries.
Finally, a narrow reading of Harlow seems appropriate when one considers the preclusive effect that the alternative interpretation would have
on civil rights claims. If Harlow prohibits inquiry into the defendant's
motives where such motives form the basis of the plaintiff's claim, it effectively eliminates any civil rights action where the plaintiff must prove
motive. Since a court would be obliged to grant a motion to dismiss
whenever the defendant's actions appear facially neutral, a plaintiff's
claim would be dismissed whenever the defendant can offer up some permissible reason for his or her actions. 1 7 As a result, plaintiffs bringing
claims based on a defendant's discriminatory intent, for example, would
good faith and within the bounds of reason will not give rise to liability); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967) (holding that an officer should be excused from liability when
acting under a statute he reasonably believes to be valid but which is later held to be
unconstitutional).
112. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
113. See id. at 322.
114. The details of plaintiff Fitzgerald's allegations are discussed in the Supreme
Court's decision in Nixon v. Fitgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 736-39 (1982).
115. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819-20 (1982); Balcerzak, supra note 91,
at 135.
116. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819-20.
117. One well cited commentator writing three years after Harlow summed up this
argument as follows:
A literal application of Harlow ... permits an official to be granted qualified
immunity as a matter of law even though the principal disputed question of fact
in the case-the true purpose or intent motivating the official's conduct-remains
unresolved. More accurately, the principal disputed question of fact, which
forms the basis of the substantive claim, is subsumed by the legal immunity
inquiry and implicitly resolved by the court against the plaintiff when it con-
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be unable to prove the central issue of their claim. Even Justice Scalia
acknowledged that a great number of civil rights claims would not survive Harlow if that case mandates dismissal of a claim whenever the defendant can proffer a reasonable pretext for his challenged conduct.' 1 8
Although a significant number of courts interpret Harlow as dealing
only with the defendant's knowledge of the law, many have still imposed
procedural restraints on plaintiffs bringing state of mind claims."19 Such
courts have justified these restraints not on Harlow's holding, but rather
on Harlow's stated goal of protecting defendants from the burdens of
trial and broad discovery.12 0 The D.C. Circuit best articulated this argument in Hobson v. Wilson.' 2 1 In Hobson, the plaintiffs sued several law
enforcement officials, claiming that their constitutional rights had been
violated by an elaborate government conspiracy directed at disrupting
the plaintiffs' political protests."2 In considering defendants' qualified
immunity defense, the court held that the plaintiffs had definitely alleged
a violation of a clearly established right.' 2 3 The court also stated, however, that some procedural restrictions are justified for intent-based
claims in light of the special danger that such claims pose for government
officials. Specifically,
plaintiffs might allege facts demonstrating that defendants have acted
lawfully, append a claim that they did so with an unconstitutional motive, and as a consequence usher defendants into discovery, and perhaps trial, with no hope of success on the merits.24The result would be
precisely the burden Harlow sought to prevent.'
Based on this perceived threat to Harlow's stated policy goals, the court
went on to increase the procedural burdens the plaintiffs had to meet to
avoid dismissal of their case. 125
C. IncreasingProceduralBurdensfor Plaintiffs Bringing
Intent-Based Claims
Whether it is based on the misconception that Harlow's holding
reaches inquiries into the defendant's motivations, or based upon a percludes, on the basis of nothing more than the official's pretextual assertions, that
the allegedly unconstitutional conduct contravened no clearly established law.
Balcerzak, supra note 91, at 138.
118. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
119. See Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 432 (6th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 488 U.S. 1007
(1989); Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 648-49 (10th Cir.
1988); Martin v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425, 1433, 1435 (D.C. Cir.) (Ginsburg, J.), reh'g granted,vacated in part, 817 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir.), reinstatedon reconsideration sub nom. Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).
120. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
121. 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).
122. See iL at 8-9.
123. See id at 29.
124. Id
125. See id at 29-31.
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ceived need to promote the policy goals that drive Harlow, many courts
have chosen to raise procedural burdens for plaintiffs bringing constitutional claims based on the defendant's state of mind. These courts have
required the plaintiff to offer an increased level of proof regarding the
defendant's allegedly unconstitutional motives before the case may proceed to trial. 2 6 Some courts require this evidence to be pleaded in the
complaint under what has been termed a "heightened pleading standard."' 1 27 Other courts, instead of requiring such evidence at the pleading stage, have demanded that the plaintiff offer this additional evidence
when the defendant moves for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 28 Some courts, determined to minimize the costs of pre-trial
proceedings for the defendant, require that such increased
evidentiary
29
standards be met without the benefit of discovery.
1. Increased Proof of Intent
Under the heightened pleading standard, complaints alleging claims
that require proof of the defendant's motives must include specific nonconclusory evidence of the defendant's unlawful intent, or face dismissal. 130 This approach, first imposed by the D.C. Circuit in Hobson v.
Wilson, '3' represents a significant departure from conventional pleading
standards. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts considering the adequacy of the plaintiff's complaint normally hold the plaintiff
to a standard of "notice pleading."'' 32 As the Supreme Court explained
in Conley v. Gibson,133 notice pleading requires only that the plaintiff provide the defendant with a short, plain statement of the facts that will give
the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon
which it rests.' 34 The plaintiff is not required to set out a detailed version
126. See infra notes 130-44 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
128. Courts following this approach effectively raise the burden of production the
plaintiff must meet lest their case be dismissed before trial. See infra notes 140-144 and
accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
130. See Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 793-94 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1991); Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797, 801-02 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), affd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1,
29 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Shannon v. General Elec. Co.,
812 F. Supp. 308, 322 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). For a discussion of the restrictions on discovery
often adopted by courts imposing the heightened pleading standard, see infra notes 14851 and accompanying text.
131. See 737 F.2d 1, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); see also
supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text (discussing how the Hobson court justified its
procedural holding on Harlow's policy goals).
132. See generally 2A James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 8.13 (2d ed.
1994) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)'s requirement that complaints provide only a plain
statement of the facts that furnishes defendants with adequate notice of the claim against
them).
133. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
134. See id. at 47.
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of the facts upon which his claim is based."3 5 Hence, by requiring that
specific evidence be pled in the complaint, the heightened pleading standard demands a substantially greater degree of specificity at the outset of

the plaintiff's case than is normally required for other civil claims.
Courts imposing the heightened pleading standard have differed as to

how specific the plaintiff's evidence must be. Since the late 1980s, the
D.C. Circuit has substantially raised the heightened pleading standard by

imposing a direct evidence rule,

36

under which a plaintiff must offer di-

rect, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence of the defendant's unconstitutional motives.13 7 As one judge criticizing the direct evidence rule has
pointed out, such a requirement allows plaintiffs to survive the height-

ened pleading standard only in the unlikely situation that the defendant
has openly confessed his unconstitutional motives. 38 Certain courts
outside the D.C. Circuit that have adopted a heightened pleading standard have nonetheless declined to adopt the direct evidence rule, requiring only that the13plaintiff
offer circumstantial evidence of the defendant's
9
unlawful intent.

Instead of requiring the plaintiff to include specific evidence of defendant's intent in the complaint, some courts have required that this evidence be offered once the defendant moves for summary judgment. " °
Although courts considering summary judgment motions normally consider the relevant evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, 14 1 courts considering motions based on qualified immunity have
shifted the burden of production onto the plaintiff.'4 2 Upon dismissing
135. See id.
136. See Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 793-94 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Siegert v. Gilley,
895 F.2d 797, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1990), affid on other grounds, II1 S. Ct. 1789 (1991);
Whitacre v. Davey, 890 F.2d 1168, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 497 U.S. 1088
(1990).
137. See Siegert, 895 F.2d at 802.
138. See Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
973 (1992).
139. See, e.g. Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing to require that the plaintiff offer direct, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence of the defendant's unlawful intent). The Ninth Circuit's based its position mainly on Supreme Court
language criticizing the D.C. Circuit's direct evidence rule. See id. at 1386 (discussing
Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1795, 1800-01 (1991) (concurring and dissenting opinions)). Although the appropriateness of the D.C. Circuit's application of the heightened
pleading standard was the original grounds for the plaintiffs appeal in Siegert, this subject was not addressed by the majority opinion. Justice Kennedy (concurring) and Justice Marshall's (dissenting) discussion of the heightened pleading standard is addressed
more fully below. See infra notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
140. See Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 432 (6th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 488 U.S. 1007
(1989); Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 649 (10th
Cir. 1988); see also Collinson v. Gott 895 F.2d 994, 1002 (4th Cir. 1990) (Phillips, J.,
concurring) (endorsing the approach of courts requiring a higher evidentiary showing
where the plaintiff's claim is based on a defendant's unlawful motives).
141. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
142. See, eg., Martin v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425, 1435 (D.C. Cir.)
(holding that the stated policy goals of the Supreme Court's decisions on qualified immunity "impels the application of a standard more demanding of plaintiffs when public of-
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the plaintiff's claim, these courts often state that although the plaintiff's
evidence would be sufficient to withstand the defendant's motion under
normal circumstances, the concerns raised by qualified immunity force
them to hold the plaintiff to a higher standard.143 As with the heightened pleading standard, there is a dispute among courts raising the sum-

mary judgment burden as to whether the plaintiff
must offer direct or
144
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's intent.

The argument that Harlow justifies an increase of evidentiary standards seems doubtful when one considers that Harlow itself said nothing

about raising procedural burdens for plaintiffs bringing intent-based
claims. Indeed, Harlow's prescription for limiting the liability of govern-

ment officials focused not on procedure but on the substantive analysis of

qualified immunity. 145 Based on this fact, critics discussing the procedural implications of Harlow have concluded that Harlow should not be
interpreted to change summary judgment analysis. 146 Some courts, recognizing the distinction between qualified immunity analysis and substantive issues relating to the underlying claim, have refused to use
Harlow as an excuse to raise the evidentiary burden the plaintiff must
47
meet in his complaint or in response to a summary judgment motion.1
ficer defendants move for summary judgment on the basis of their qualified immunity"),
reh'ggranted, vacated in part, 817 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir.), reinstatedon reconsiderationsub
nom. Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Gooden
v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960, 971 (4th Cir. 1992) (Phillips, J.,dissenting) (noting
how courts have adjusted summary judgment practice to remove the burden from defendant-movant).
143. See, e.g., Pueblo, 847 F.2d at 649 ("Even if [plaintiff's evidence] could be construed to allow a plaintiff to remain in court in an ordinary case, they will not be adequate
in a case of this type.").
144. Compare Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 432 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
plaintiff must present direct evidence that the officials' actions were improperly motivated
in order to defeat summary judgment motion), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989), with
Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991) (requiring that the plaintiff put
forward only circumstantial evidence of the defendant's intent), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
973 (1992).
145. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Henk J.Brands, Note, Qualified Immunity and the Allocation of Decision-Making FunctionsBetween Judge and Jury, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1045, 1057 (1990)
(arguing that since Harlow did not change the summary judgment standard, a jury should
still hear the case when the plaintiff's version of the facts would not give rise to qualified
immunity but the defendant's version would); Balcerzak, supra note 91, at 140 (arguing
that since Harlow did not purport to alter the summary judgment standard, a court
should only determine whether disputed questions of fact exist and avoid adjudicating
such questions before trial); see also, Edmund L. Carey, Jr., Note, Quick Termination of
InsubstantialCivil Rights Claims: QualifiedImmunity and ProceduralFairness,38 Vand.
L. Rev. 1543, 1558-59 (1985) (noting that the Harlow Court gave no indication that it
intended to alter the summary judgment analysis).
147. See, e.g., Feliciano-Angulo v. Rivera-Cruz, 858 F.2d 40, 47 (1st Cir. 1988) (rejecting defendant's request to hold plaintiff to a more demanding standard of proof in
light of persisting factual disputes); Sanchez v. Sanchez, 777 F. Supp. 906, 916 (D.N.M.
1991) (arguing that the issue of motive is a question of fact distinct from the qualified
immunity analysis, and that summary judgment will work to dismiss a plaintiff's claim
where the defendant offers insufficient evidence).
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2. Restrictions on Discovery
In order to further insulate government officials from potentially frivolous suits, many courts imposing increased evidentiary standards bar discovery until the plaintiff offers what the court construes to be sufficient
evidence of the defendant's unlawful intent. The apparent origin of this
approach was the D.C. Circuit's decision in Hobson v. Wilson,' 48 where
the court held that discovery should not be allowed before satisfaction of
the heightened pleading standard. 4 9 Several courts have followed Hobson's lead, refusing to allow discovery before the plaintiff has met either
the heightened pleading standard or the increased burden of persuasion
imposed under a motion for summary judgment.' 50 Under this approach, once the defendant moves for dismissal or summary judgment,
all discovery is halted until the plaintiff can show specific,
and in some
5
instances direct, evidence of the defendant's intent.1 '
It is not difficult to see how a ban on discovery can put the plaintiff in
an altogether untenable position. When combined with increased evidentiary standards (especially the direct evidence standard), such a restriction can effectively quash the plaintiff's ability to bring his claim.' 5 2
Under this approach, courts not only demand the plaintiff to show more
proof than is normally required to reach trial, but also cut off the plaintiff's access to the one mechanism by which they can obtain the necessary
evidence.' 5 3 Realizing these effects, many courts have simply rejected a
148. 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1984 (1985).
149. The court acknowledged, however, that the evidence plaintiffs would be able to
offer pending discovery would in all likelihood be "broad and speculative," and thus that
the rule should not be enforced with too much rigidity. See id. at 30-31.
150. See, eg., Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that
discovery may not be allowed until the plaintiff has produced specific, non-conclusory
evidence of the defendant's intent), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992); Siegert v. Gilley,
895 F.2d 797, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (refusing to allow even limited discovery into the
defendant's intent where the plaintiff has failed to allege direct evidence of defendant's
motives), ajfd on other grounds, Ill S. Ct. 1789 (1991); see also Lewis v. City of Ft.
Collins, 903 F.2d 752, 758 (10th Cir. 1990) (arguing that a trial court should not allow
further discovery after the defendant moves for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity even when the plaintiff claims such discovery is necessary to obtain evidence of
the defendant's unlawful intent).
151. See Elliott, 937 F.2d at 344; Siegert, 895 F.2d at 802.
152. See Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered
Questions, 23 Georgia L. Rev. 597, 647 (1989) (arguing that since the motive underlying a
defendant's actions is a fact solely within the knowledge of the defendant, a court cannot
fairly grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment before the plaintiff has been
given an opportunity to conduct discovery into that issue); Rudovsky, supra note 15, at
63 ("Where the plaintiff must establish the [intent] element as part of the constitutional
claim, denial of discovery on this issue would make it impossible to prove certain cases.");
see also David A. Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibilityin the Summary Judgment
Contex" A Better Approach, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 774, 785 (1983) (arguing that the plaintiff's right to trial should not be denied before he has had the opportunity to complete
discovery).
153. See Siegert, 895 F.2d at 805 (Wald, C.J., dissenting) ("This case brings into sharp
focus a dilemma created by our circuit's current jurisprudence on qualified immunity:
plaintiffs are required to adhere to a 'heightened pleading standard' of non-conclusory
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ban on discovery and allowed at least limited discovery into the defendant's motives.15 4 These courts have noted that it is unfair to deny the
plaintiff the ability to establish the single most important element of his
claim. 155
Barring discovery into the defendant's motives seems even more inappropriate when one closely scrutinizes Harlow and the Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in Mitchell v. Forsyth. 5 6 Although Harlow banned
all discovery pending resolution of the qualified immunity issue,15 7 it also
limited the analysis required under qualified immunity to a consideration
of whether the plaintiff's complaint alleged a violation of clearly established law.I58 Given this limitation on the qualified immunity analysis, it
follows that Harlow's ban on discovery should be lifted once it is established that the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly defined right,
thus allowing the plaintiff the discovery required to support his substantive claim. Mitchell v. Forsyth159 further supports this interpretation. In
Mitchell, the Court stated that if "the plaintiff's complaint adequately
alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law, the
defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant
in fact committed those acts.'
Such language clearly contemplates
that plaintiffs will be afforded the discovery necessary to factually support their substantive claim. Thus, the relevant Supreme Court decisions
as well as the inevitable result of a complete discovery ban favor allowing
at least limited discovery into the defendant's motives where intent is an
element of the plaintiff's claim.
III.

LEATHERMAN

v.

TARRANT COUNTY NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE &
A LITERAL READING OF THE

COORDINATION UNIT:

FEDERAL RULES

As previously discussed,16 ' courts that impose a heightened pleading
facts that demonstrate a government official's unconstitutional motive, but they are entirely restricted from obtaining through discovery the information necessary to make that
showing."), afl'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991).

154. See, e.g., Feliciano-Angulo v. Rivera-Cruz, 858 F.2d 40, 47 (1st Cir. 1988) (refusing to grant summary judgment before more discovery into the defendant's motives is
conducted); Martin v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425, 1437 (D.C. Cir.) (al-

lowing limited discovery into the defendant's motives where the defendant's intent an
element of the plaintiff's substantive claim), reh'g granted, vacated in part, 817 F.2d 144
(D.C. Cir.), reinstatedon reconsiderationsub nom. Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824
F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Stone's Auto Mart, Inc. v. St. Paul, 721 F. Supp. 206, 211 (D.
Minn. 1989) (refusing to grant the defendant's request for a ban on discovery based on
qualified immunity).
155. See Martin, 812 F.2d at 1437.
156. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
157. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

158.
159.
160.
161.

See id.
472 U.S. 511 (1985).
See id. at 526.
See supra part II.B.
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standard or that raise the level of proof necessary for plaintiffs to survive
a motion for summary judgment depart from the normal procedural
standards provided for in the Federal Rules. 1 6 2 With regard to pleading,
Rule 8163 requires that complaints meet a standard of mere notice pleading under which plaintiffs are not required to present their evidence in
any detail. 1" Although Rule 9(b) specifies claims that must be pled with
particularity, that rule does not mention civil rights claims.' 6 Thus, by
requiring the complaint to incorporate an increased level of evidence regarding the defendant's unlawful motives, the heightened pleading standard exceeds the evidentiary requirements outlined in the Federal Rules.
Under Rule 56(c), a court must deny a summary judgment motion
whenever the relevant evidence presents any material issue of fact.",
While the Supreme Court has emphasized that summary judgment
should actively be used to dismiss complaints where the plaintiff fails to
support an essential element of his claim, 67 courts considering such motions are obliged to accept as true all the evidence presented by the non68
movant and draw all justifiable inferences in the non-movant's favor.1
In light of this standard, courts that shift the evidentiary burden to the
plaintiff when the defendant moving for summary judgment is protected
by qualified immunity depart significantly from the standards provided
for in the Federal Rules and in the relevant Supreme Court case law.
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether these increased procedural burdens are an appropriate method of dealing with potentially
frivolous constitutional damage claims that require proof of the defend162. See supra notes 130-35, 140-43 and accompanying text.
163. The individual Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be refered to as "Rule
164. Rule 8 provides in pertinent part that a pleading need only set forth only "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .. " See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text (discussing
how the heightened pleading standard departs from the usual notice pleading
requirements).
165. Rule 9(b) provides that "[iun all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). It
is interesting to note that Rule 9(b) permits malice, intent, and knowledge to be averred
generally. See id.Thus, even if Rule 9(b) did require that civil rights claims be pleaded
with particularity, this requirement would not apply to allegations regarding the defendant's unlawful motives.
166. Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
167. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Celotex's standard for
summary judgment substantially eases the burden a defendant must meet before a court
will dismiss the plaintiff's case. Cf Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157
(1970) (requiring the movant to prove the absence of any dispute as to any material fact
before summary judgment can be granted).
168. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
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ant's intent.' 69 The only Supreme Court language addressing procedural
standards in intent-based claims can be found in Siegert v. Gilley, 7 °
where the Court granted certiorarito consider the plaintiff's challenge to
the D.C. Circuit's application of the heightened pleading standard.
Although the Siegert Court ultimately affirmed the case on other
grounds, 7 ' both Justices Kennedy and Marshall briefly discussed the
D.C. Circuit's pleading requirements. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy endorsed the D.C. Circuit's heightened pleading standard, arguing that an increased standard was a justifiable way of discouraging
meritless suits, although the direct evidence rule went too far in restricting the plaintiff's claim.' 7 2 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall
more vigorously objected to the D.C. Circuit's approach, but still implied
that the plaintiff should be required to offer at least circumstantial proof
at the pleading stage. 7 '
In stark contrast to the concurring and dissenting opinions in Siegert
stands the Supreme Court's recent decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant
County NarcoticsIntelligence & CoordinationUnit,'7 4 in which the Court
rejected pleading requirements that exceeded those provided for in the
Federal Rules. In Leatherman, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's
application of a heightened pleading standard to a plaintiff's § 1983
claim against a local municipality.' 7 5 In rejecting the lower court's use of
the standard, the Court stated flatly that Rule 9(b) represented an exhaustive list of claims where particularity in pleading may be required. 7' 6
Since Rule 9(b) fails to mention civil rights claims, the Court found it
impossible to reconcile the Fifth Circuit's departure from the notice
pleading standard with the procedural framework created under the Federal Rules. 7'7
Leatherman strongly suggests that courts may not violate a plaintiff's
procedural rights by forcing him to satisfy higher procedural burdens
than are required under the Federal Rules. Even construed narrowly,
Leatherman prevents courts from enforcing a heightened pleading standard since that approach requires a level of specificity beyond the maximum imposed under the notice pleading standard. Judge Edwards
recognized this interpretation in his dissent to the D.C. Circuit's decision
169. See Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 431 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007

(1989).
170. 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991).
171. In Siegert, the majority opinion ignored the plaintiff's challenge to the heightened
pleading standard and affirmed the case based on the plaintiff's failure to allege a genuine

cause of action under the Constitution. See id. at 1794. The Court maintained that the
issue of whether the plaintiff has alleged a viable claim analytically precedes any consideration of the defendant's immunity. See id. at 1793.
172. See id. at 1795.
173. See id. at 1800-01.
174. 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).

175. See id. at 1161.
176. See id. at 1163.
177. See id.
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in Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 78 where he questioned whether the underlying
rationale of the heightened pleading standard survived the Supreme
Court's decision in Leatherman. 79
More significantly, Leatherman represents a broad rejection of procedural standards that are increased pursuant to perceived policy goals.
Despite the elaborate policy justifications offered by the defendant to support the Fifth Circuit's pleading standard, 8 ' the Court nonetheless measured the Fifth Circuit's approach against the applicable Federal Rules,
and rejected it for exceeding the boundaries provided therein.' 8 ' Thus,
courts that shift the summary judgment burden or that impose bans on
discovery before that burden is met violate Leatherman's holding since
such procedural
practices contradict the standards established by
182
Congress.
IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF HARLOW AND LEATHERMAN: A RETURN
To CONVENTIONAL PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS

After Leatherman, courts have no justification for raising procedural
burdens for motive-based claims beyond the levels provided for in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 83 As discussed previously, to interpret Harlow's holding as barring or even restricting inquiries into the
defendant's motives effectively subsumes the factual issues of the defendant's purpose (which relates to the plaintiff's substantive claim) into the
issue of the defendant's legal knowledge (which relates to qualified immunity). 184 Based on the cases leading up to Harlow and on Harlow's
own procedural history, it is clear that the Court, in establishing a wholly
objective standard for qualified immunity, meant only to foreclose inquiries into the defendant's knowledge of the law.' 85 This conclusion becomes even more obvious when one considers that claims such as those
alleging discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment would effectively be barred if plaintiffs are unable to prove intent when suing government officials protected by qualified immunity.' 86
As for courts like that in Hobson that impose increased procedural
burdens in order to achieve the policy goals discussed in Harlow,
Leatherman indicates that such courts are not entitled to raise procedural burdens to the point where plaintiffs are denied the generally liberal standards provided for under the Federal Rules. 8 7 One may view
Leatherman as an implicit recognition that the Federal Rules are not
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

6 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
See id. 804-05.
See Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162.
See id at 1162-63.
See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86-91, 107-18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
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mere options for courts to consider in designing procedural approaches
to difficult issues, but are instead statutory boundaries imposed by Congress that often represent hard fought compromises between the interests
88
of plaintiffs and defendants.
Ultimately, concerns regarding unfounded allegations of unlawful intent can be adequately addressed through the application of procedural
mechanisms already provided for under the Federal Rules. Although the
policy of notice pleading prohibits a court from dismissing a complaint
for lack of specific evidence of the defendant's intent,8 9 the defendant
may still eventually have the claim dismissed if the plaintiff is incapable
of alleging any evidence of the defendant's intent once discovery has occurred.19 Under the Federal Rules, parties are entitled to move for summary judgment at any time after the pleadings have been filed.' 9' Since
the Federal Rules afford the trial judge significant control over the scope
of discovery once a party moves for summary judgment, 9 2 it is therefore
unlikely that plaintiffs bringing unfounded claims will be able to subject
the defendant to overly burdensome discovery. Where the plaintiff's
claim appears conclusory, a court can direct limited and supervised discovery into the defendant's motives, thus sparing the defendant from
broad ranging discovery while still allowing the plaintiff a fair opportu93
nity to establish the required element of intent.
Although the application of conventional procedural standards will no
doubt make it more difficult to dismiss claims that ultimately prove to be
frivolous, that sacrifice seems justified when one considers the policy issues that are implicated by constitutional damage claims and qualified
immunity. As the Harlow court acknowledged, a suit for monetary damages often represents the only way plaintiffs can effectively vindicate violations of their constitutional rights." 4 If one accepts the premise that
plaintiffs should be able to bring claims such as those based on discriminatory intent as easily as those based on non-subjective elements, it is
imperative that courts allow such plaintiffs to make use of the pre-trial
188. See 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1201 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing past failed attempts to amend the Federal Rules so as to
increase the requirements of pleading).
189. See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
190. If the plaintiff cannot offer evidence to support his allegation that the defendant
acted with an unconstitutional purpose, the plaintiff has failed to establish an essential
element of the claim, thus allowing the court to grant summary judgment under the
standard articulated in the Celotex case. See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
191. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(b) provides that a defending party may move for summary
judgment at any time, with or without supporting affidavits.
192. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) provides that once the summary judgment motion has been
made and the plaintiff cannot allege sufficient facts to defeat the motion, the court may
permit "depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as
is just."
193. See Carey, supra note 146, at 1563 (arguing that courts considering summary
judgment motions should allow limited discovery into the defendant's motives when such
motives are an element of the plaintiff's claim).
194. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
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procedures that are afforded plaintiffs bringing other civil claims. While
this more limited application of Harlow will not restrict claims based on
motive, it still allows Harlow to perform its intended purpose of dismissing those claims which are not based on rights which have been
clearly defined under the Constitution. In the end, this solution represents the only way to maintain the balance Harlow was intended to establish between the need to provide plaintiffs with an adequate remedy for
violations of their constitutional rights and the need to insulate government officials from the burden of defending frivolous suits.
CONCLUSION

Despite the desire to protect government defendants from meritless
claims, lower federal courts cannot use Harlow v. Fitzgerald'95 to increase procedural burdens for claims requiring proof of the defendant's
intent. Harlow's holding limits only those subjective inquiries that were
formerly available to defeat claims of qualified immunity.' 96 Furthermore, Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit197 makes clear that courts cannot unduly raise procedural
standards for plaintiffs based on perceived policy goals.' 98 Ultimately,
applying the procedural standards provided for in the Federal Rules will
strike the optimal balance between protecting government defendants
and allowing plaintiffs to bring constitutional damage claims requiring
proof of the defendant's intent.
195.
196.
197.
198.

457 U.S. 800 (1982).
See id at 815-18.
113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
See supra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.

